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ABSTRACT
Elliptic curve cryptography plays a crucial role in network and communica tio n
security.

However, implementation of elliptic curve cryptography,

especially

the

implementation of scalar multiplication on an elliptic curve, faces multiple challenges. One
of the main challenges is side channel attacks (SCAs). SCAs pose a real threat to the
conventional implementations of scalar multiplication such as binary methods (also called
doubling-and-add

methods).

Several

scalar

multiplication

algorithms

with

countermeasures against side channel attacks have been proposed. Among them,
Montgomery Powering Ladder (MPL) has been shown an effective countermeasure against
simple power analysis. However, MPL is still vulnerable to certain more sophisticated side
channel attacks. A recently proposed modified MPL utilizes a combination of sequence
masking (SM), exponent splitting (ES) and point randomization (PR). And it has shown to
be one of the best countermeasure algorithms that are immune to many sophisticated side
channel attacks [11]. In this thesis, an efficient hardware architecture for this algorithm is
proposed and its FPGA implementation is also presented. To our best knowledge, this is
the first time that this modified MPL with SM, ES, and PR has been implemented in
hardware.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
The Internet is increasingly important to the people all over the world who use it
for personal and business purposes. While the internet brings much convenience to people,
there still exist security risks and vulnerabilities in using the internet. For example, various
cyber-attacks, including side channel attacks, pose a great danger for the Internet users.
Network security, which provides physical and software countermeasures to protect the
network from unauthorized access and attacks, becomes a very active research area and
industry. Cryptography plays a critical role in providing essential and unique network
security services to the internet.
There are two main families of cryptography from the point of view of key
generation, symmetric-key cryptography and asymmetric-key cryptography. In symmetr ickey cryptography system, there is only one key used both for encryption and decryption.
This system requires that both parties involved in the communication share one secret key,
which has to be pre-arranged in advance in a procedure called key establishment. This is
regarded as a main drawback of symmetric-key cryptography system since it cannot
resolve the issue of key establishment without resorting to a third party.
Unlike symmetric-key cryptography system, the asymmetric-key cryptography
system (more popularly known as public-key system) uses two keys, one for encryption
and the other for decryption. The key used for encryption is the public key, which is
accessible to the public and can be distributed widely and easily. The other one used for
decryption is the private key, which must be kept secret and is only known to the owner of
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the cryptosystem. By differentiating the encryption key and decryption key, the
asymmetric-cryptography system can provide very important and unique security services
such like key exchange and digital signature. A drawback of asymmetric-cryptograp hy
systems is that they have higher computational complexity, compared to symmetrical key
systems.
Since Diffie and Hellman proposed the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme as
the first

asymmetric-cryptography

system in 1976 [3], several asymmetric- key

cryptography systems have been presented, such like RSA, ElGamel, and Elliptic curve
cryptography. All these algorithms are based on some different hard mathematica l
problems. Based on their underlying mathematical problems, these algorithms can be
classified as follows.
Public key system

Hard Math Problems

RSA

Integer factorization

ElGamal

Discrete logarithm problem

Elliptic curve cryptosystem

Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem

Table 1.1 Public key systems and the hard math problems
The security strength of the cryptosystem relies on the fact it is hard to solve these
mathematical problems. The Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC), first proposed by Miller
and Koblitz in 1985 [1], [2], can provide higher security strength per bit compared to other
asymmetric-cryptography system such like RSA. This is because elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem (ECDLP) is much harder to solve than factorization of a product of two
large primes.
2

Security Level (bits)

RSA Key Size (bits)

ECC Key Size (bits)

80

1024

160

112

2048

224

128

3072

256

192

7680

384

256

15360

512

Table 1.2 A comparison of key sizes
The large RSA key size requires long computation time and large VLSI area when
implemented in hardware. While ECC is based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem, the security of ECC relies on the difficulty of elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem. ECC can provide same level security strength as RSA with much shorter keys.
Table 1.2 shows a comparison of key sizes needed to achieve equivalent level of security
strength. This feature of ECC makes it very suitable for smart cards, credit cards, pagers,
PDAs and mobile phones [4].
Other than solving the difficult ECDLP to break ECC mathematically, attackers
can take advantage of the physical implementation and retrieve secret parameters by
observing the information leaked during the computation. This method is referred to as
Side Channel Attacks (SCA) and discussed in [5], [6]. Scalar multiplication, which
multiplies a point on an elliptic curve by a scalar, is the main computation involved in ECC.
Unguarded scalar multiplication algorithms are vulnerable to SCAs. In order to protect
3

ECC from SCA, the computation steps involved in the scalar multiplication algorithms
have to be regular so that less useful side channel information can be leaked to attackers.
There have been several existing algorithms for computing the scalar multiplication. A
classical algorithm is the binary algorithm or doubling-and-add., it can be easily cracked
by Simple Power Analysis (SPA) since it may consume different power in each iteration,
depending on binary bit of the scalar. To withstand SPA, a double and add always
algorithm is proposed by Coron in 1999 [7]. The idea is to add a dummy operation to make
every iteration consume same power, thus the computation is regular in each step. However,
this algorithm still remains insecure against a doubling attack proposed by Fouque in 2003
[8]. To provide further protection against various SCAs, Montgomery Powering Ladder
(MPL) is invented by Marc Joye and Sung-Ming Yen in 2003 [9]. Although MPL is highly
regular and efficient compared to the classical algorithms, it is still subject to SCAs such
like Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Introduced by Kocher in 1999 [10], Differentia l
Power Analysis focus on capturing the power consumption of the target device and by
analyzing the power consumption to get information of the secret key. Another Modified
Montgomery Power Ladder algorithm proposed by He in [11] can provide protection to
more SCAs than the regular MPL. To the best of our knowledge, scalar multiplica tio n
based on this algorithm has not yet been implemented. Thus an efficient implementa tio n
of ECC, which can resist more SCAs is needed for modern cryptographic applications.

1.2 A Summary of Contributions
In this thesis we propose an efficient hardware architecture for the modified MPL
with sequence masking (SM), exponent splitting (ES) and point randomization (PR)
4

algorithm [11]. More specifically we


Proposed an efficient hardware architecture for the modified MPL with SM,
ES and PR algorithm [11].



Presented a FPGA implementation for the modified MPL with SM, ES and
PR algorithm [11], which is the first time in literature.

1.3 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II provided mathematica l
background in finite field and elliptic curve which are important for understanding the
proposed work. The concept of SCA is introduced and then many types of SCAs are
reviewed in Chapter III. In Chapter IV an overview of existing related works is given.
Chapter V provides a detailed discussion on a modified MPL with SM, ES and PR. Chapter
VI proposes an efficient hardware architecture for the modified MPL with SM, ES and PR.
FPGA implementation of the proposed architecture is also presented and the FPGA results
are analyzed and discussed. Conclusive remarks are given and possible future works are
commented in Chapter VII.

5

CHAPTER II
MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND
This chapter introduces the related mathematical background of the ECC based
systems. Definition of finite field and elliptic curve are given. Arithmetic over finite field,
point operations over elliptic curve is also curved. Finally, some ECC scheme is introduced.
2.1 Finite Field
Finite field, also known as Galois Field (GF), is proposed by Galois in 1832. Galois
Theory emphasis a relation between groups and fields. Finite field was introduced as an
example of a field. A finite field is a finite set of numbers in which addition and
multiplication are defined. It is an additive group under the addition operation. All the
nonzero elements in a finite field form a multiplicative group under multiplica tio n
operation. Primitive element is the generator of the multiplicative group. For a finite field
𝐹, if n is the smallest integer satisfying that 𝑛𝑎 = 0 for every field element a in the finite
field 𝐹, then n is the characteristic of 𝐹.
Prime finite field 𝐺𝐹(𝑝) consists of elements {0,1,2 … 𝑝 − 1}, where p is a prime
number. Arithmetic in 𝐺𝐹(𝑝) can be described as follows. Addition is defined as modulo𝑝 addition. Multiplication is defined as modulo-𝑝 multiplication. 𝑝 is the characteristic of
𝐺𝐹(𝑝).
Extension finite field 𝐺𝐹(𝑝𝑚 ), where p is a prime and m is a positive integer greater
than 1, the elements of 𝐺𝐹(𝑝 𝑚 ) are polynomials of degree up to 𝑚 − 1 with coefficie nts
belonging to 𝐺𝐹(𝑝),
𝐺𝐹 (𝑝 𝑚 ) = {𝑎𝑚−1 𝑥 𝑚−1 + 𝑎𝑚−2 𝑥 𝑚−2 + ⋯ + 𝑎2 𝑥 2 + 𝑎1 𝑥 + 𝑎0 }
where 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐺𝐹(2), irreducible polynomial is 𝑓(𝑥). 𝑝 is a prime and m is a positive integer
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greater than 1, the elements of 𝐺𝐹(𝑝 𝑚 ) are polynomials of degree up to 𝑚 − 1 with
coefficients belonging to 𝐺𝐹(𝑝). The irreducible polynomial 𝑓(𝑥 ) cannot be factored into
product of polynomials that has degree less than m.
Binary Extension finite field 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚 ) is a special case of 𝐺𝐹(𝑝 𝑚 ), where is
consists of 2𝑚 elements and its characteristic is 2.
𝐺𝐹(2𝑚 ) = {𝑎𝑚−1 𝑥 𝑚−1 + 𝑎𝑚−2 𝑥 𝑚−2 + ⋯ + 𝑎2 𝑥 2 + 𝑎1 𝑥 + 𝑎0 },
where 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐺𝐹(2) , irreducible polynomial is 𝑓 (𝑥 ) . Elements in this field can be
represented as (𝑚 − 1) degree polynomial, for example if 𝐴 is an element in 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚 ), 𝐴
can be represented as
𝐴 = 𝑎𝑚−1 𝑥 𝑚−1 + 𝑎𝑚−2 𝑥 𝑚−2 + ⋯ + 𝑎2 𝑥 2 + 𝑎1 𝑥 + 𝑎0 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐺𝐹 (2)
It can also be represented as an m bits binary string (𝑎𝑚−1 , 𝑎𝑚−2 , …, 𝑎1 , 𝑎0), where 𝑎𝑖 ∈
𝐺𝐹(2) . This representation is defined as the polynomial basis representation. This
representation is beneficial in hardware implementation since its operations like addition
and multiplication can be realized using AND logic gate and XOR logic gate. The additio n
operation over binary extension field is modulo 2 addition. The multiplication is modulo
𝑓(𝑥 ), modulo 2 multiplication.
2.2 Elliptic Curve over GF(2m)
Let p be a prime number greater than 3, and coefficients 𝑎, 𝑏 in the field 𝐺𝐹(𝑝),
then the elliptic curve E over 𝐺𝐹(𝑝) is defined with equation:
E: 𝑦 2 = 𝑥 3 + 𝑎𝑥 2 + 𝑏
This equation is a simplified Weierstrass equation. The points on the curve satisfy
that both the 𝑥-coordinate and 𝑦-coordinate are both elements over 𝐺𝐹(𝑝). Assume there
7

two points 𝑃 (𝑥 1 , 𝑦1 ) and 𝑄 (𝑥 2 , 𝑦2 ) on the curve. The group operator point addition obeys
the following rules. Draw a line through point 𝑃 and 𝑄, if there exists a third point
𝑅 (𝑥3 , 𝑦3 ) which intersects with the curve. The mirror reflection of 𝑅 about the 𝑥-axis is
defined as the addition result. If such an intersection point does not exist, we consider the
result as infinity. The point at infinity 𝑂, defined by 𝑃 + 𝑂 = 𝑂, exists for every elliptic
curve. The additive inverse of point 𝑃 is its reflection across the 𝑥-axis. All the points on
curve E and the point at infinity forms a group 𝐺 defined by the point addition operator. 𝐺
is an abelian group sine the group operator addition is commutative.

Figure 2.1 Point addition on ECC
If 𝑃 and 𝑄 satisfy 𝑥 1 ≠ 𝑥2, then we have point addition computed using the
following equation.
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𝑦1 + 𝑦2
𝑥1 + 𝑥2
2
𝑥3 = 𝜆 + 𝑥1 + 𝑥2
{𝑦3 = (𝑥1 + 𝑥 3 )𝜆 + 𝑦1
𝜆=

If 𝑃 and 𝑄 satisfy 𝑃 = 𝑄 and 𝑦1 ≠ 0, then point doubling is defined below.
3𝑥 12 + 𝑎
2𝑦1
2
𝑥 3 = 𝜆 + 2𝑥 1
{𝑦3 = (𝑥1 + 𝑥 3 )𝜆 + 𝑦1
𝜆=

For an integer 𝑘, scalar multiplication 𝑘𝑃 is defined as repeated addition like
𝑘𝑃 = 𝑃 + 𝑃 + ⋯ 𝑃
repeated for 𝑘 times.
The order n of point P is defined as the minimal integer satisfies 𝑛𝑃 = 𝑂.
Let a and b be elements in 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚 ). An elliptic curve E over 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚 ) can be
defined by the equation
E: 𝑦 2 + 𝑥𝑦 = 𝑥 3 + 𝑎𝑥 2 + 𝑏
Points over elliptic curve defined in 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚 ) have similar operations to that defined
in 𝐺𝐹(𝑝). Consider two points 𝑃 (𝑥1 , 𝑦1 ) and 𝑄 (𝑥 2 , 𝑦2 ) on the curve, and 𝑅 (𝑥 3 , 𝑦3 ) be
the result of 𝑃 + 𝑄. If 𝑃 = 𝑄, point addition is computed as follows.
𝑦1 + 𝑦2
𝑥1 + 𝑥2
2
𝑥3 = 𝜆 + 𝜆 + 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + 𝑎
{𝑦3 = (𝑥 1 + 𝑥 3 )𝜆 + 𝑥 3 + 𝑦1
𝜆=

If 𝑃 ≠ 𝑄, point doubling is performed as below.
𝑦1
+ 𝑥1
𝑥1
𝑥 3 = 𝜆2 + 𝜆 + 𝑎
{𝑦3 = 𝑥 1 2 + 𝜆𝑥 3 + 𝑥 3
𝜆=
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All the addition, multiplication and inversion involved in there equations are finite
field arithmetic. The most time consuming operations are finite field multiplication and
inversion.
2.3 Elliptic Curve
For a given field 𝐺𝐹(𝑝) and curve E over the field, it is easy to calculate 𝑘𝑃 for a
point 𝑃 on the curve. However, if 𝑘𝑃 and 𝑃 is known, it is considered very difficult to
calculate integer 𝑘. This is called the ECDLP problem, and the security strength of ECC
relies on it.
2.3.1 System Setup
To setup a secure elliptic curve cryptography system, the parameters of the curve
has to be chosen very carefully. The elliptic curve used in the system need to be nonsingular since singular curves are easy to crack.
The parameters needed to construct an elliptic curve cryptography system includ ing
the following. Finite field 𝐺𝐹(𝑝) defined by 𝑝, elliptic curve E defined by 𝑎 and 𝑏, base
point 𝑃, the order of the base point 𝑛 and the factor ℎ. The parameter set is known to the
public.
If the system is over 𝐺𝐹(𝑝) , the parameter set is 𝐷 = {𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑃, 𝑛, ℎ} . The
parameters are defined as above stated. If the cryptography system is built over 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚 ),
the parameter set is 𝐷 = {𝑚, 𝑓(𝑥), 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑃, 𝑛, ℎ} where 𝑓(𝑥) is the irreducible polynomia l
define the field. To calculate factor ℎ, first count all the points and the point at infinity to
get the order of the elliptic curve #E, then h is #E divided by 𝑛.
2.3.2 Generation of the key pairs
After the system is set up, assume Bob is trying to communicate with Alice. Alice
10

will choose the keys as introduced below.
Step 1: Choose a random integer 𝑑 ∈ [1, 𝑛 − 1]
Step 2: Computes point 𝑄 = 𝑑𝑃
The public key is point 𝑄, and private key is integer 𝑑.
2.3.3 Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES)
The most extended encryption and decryption scheme based on ECC is the Ellip tic
Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES). This scheme is a variant of the ElGama l
scheme proposed in [12]. This scheme is described as follows:
System Setup:
Step 1: Alice sets the ECC system parameter sets 𝐷 = {𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑃, 𝑛, ℎ}
Step 2: Computes Key Pair (𝑄, 𝑑)
Encryption:
Step 1: Bob selects a random number 𝑘 ∈ [1, 𝑛 − 1]
Step 2: Computes 𝑅 = 𝑘𝑃, and 𝑍 = ℎ𝑘𝑄.
Step 3: 𝑋 -coordinate of 𝑍 and 𝑅 is converted to (𝑘1 , 𝑘2 ) using a key derivation hash
function
Step 4: Message m is encrypted with 𝑘1 using a symmetrical key cipher to get 𝐶 =
𝐸𝑁𝐶 (𝑚)
Step 5: Computes 𝑡 = 𝑀𝐴𝐶 (𝐶) using 𝑘2 , where 𝑀𝐴𝐶 is a message authentication code
Step 6: Cipher text (𝑅, 𝐶, 𝑡) is sent to Alice
Decryption:
Step 1: Alice computes 𝑍 = ℎ𝑑𝑅
Step 2: 𝑋 -coordinate of 𝑍 and 𝑅 is converted to (𝑘1 , 𝑘2 ) using a key derivation hash
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function
Step 3: Computes 𝑡 = 𝑀𝐴𝐶 (𝐶) using 𝑘2 , where 𝑀𝐴𝐶 is a message authentication code
Step 4: Message m is decrypted with 𝑘1 using a symmetrical key cipher to get 𝑚 =
𝐷𝐸𝐶 (𝐶)
This scheme works since when Alice generates 𝑍, it follows that,
𝑍 = ℎ𝑑𝑅 = ℎ𝑑 (𝑘𝑃) = ℎ𝑘(𝑑𝑃) = ℎ𝑘𝑄
So both the encryption and decryption generate the same key pair (𝑘1 , 𝑘2 ).
2.3.4 Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange (ECDHKE)
ECDHKE is the generic key exchange scheme based on the Diffie-Hellma n
mechanism applied to elliptic curves [13]. The information available to the public is the
elliptic curve E over 𝐺𝐹(𝑝), and a point 𝑃 with order n on the curve. The computations are
described as follows:
Computation of Alice:
Step 1: Alice chooses random number 𝑎 ∈ [1, 𝑛 − 1]
Step 2: Computes 𝑎𝑃 and it is sent to Bob
Step 3: After receiving 𝑏𝑃 form Bob, Alice computes scalar multiplication 𝑎(𝑏𝑃) to get
𝑎𝑏𝑃
Computation of Bob:
Step 1: Bob chooses random number 𝑏 ∈ [1, 𝑛 − 1]
Step 2: Computes 𝑏𝑃 and it is sent to Alice
Step 3: After receiving 𝑎𝑃 form Alice, Bob computes scalar multiplication 𝑏 (𝑎𝑃) to get
𝑏𝑎𝑃
The secret key shared by the two parties is 𝑘 = 𝑎𝑏𝑃. By applying this scheme, the
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secret key is securely exchanged.
2.3.5 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
ECDSA is the elliptic curve variant of the Digital Signature Algorithm [14]. This
scheme can be introduced as the following steps:
System Setup:
Step 1: Alice sets the ECC system parameter sets 𝐷 = {𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑃, 𝑛, ℎ}
Step 2: Computes Key Pair (𝑄, 𝑑)
Signing of the message:
Step 1: Alice calculates 𝑒 = 𝐻 (𝑚), where H is a hash function.
Step 2: Chooses random number 𝑘 ∈ [1, 𝑛 − 1]
Step 3: Calculates point 𝑅 = 𝑘𝑃 (𝑥1 , 𝑦1 ).
Step 4: Calculates 𝑠𝑖𝑔1 = 𝑥 1 mod 𝑛. If 𝑠𝑖𝑔1 = 0, Alice chooses another 𝑘.
Step 5: Calculates 𝑠𝑖𝑔2 = 𝑘 −1 (𝑒 + 𝑑𝑥 1 ) mod 𝑛.
Step 6: The signature is the pair (𝑠𝑖𝑔1 , 𝑠𝑖𝑔2 ).
Verification of the signature:
Step 1: Bob calculates 𝑒 = 𝐻 (𝑚), where 𝐻 is a hash function.
Step 2: Calculates 𝑤 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔2−1 mod 𝑛.
Step 3: Calculates 𝑢1 = 𝑒𝑤 mod 𝑛 and 𝑢 2 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔1 𝑤 mod 𝑛.
Step 4: Calculates point 𝑋 = 𝑢 1 𝑃 + 𝑢 2 𝑄 and retrieve the 𝑥-coordinate of 𝑋 denoted by
𝑥2
Step 5: The signature is valid if 𝑠𝑖𝑔1 = 𝑥 2 mod 𝑛, if not the signature is rejected.
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To prove the correctness of the algorithm, the following equation can be performed.
𝑋 = 𝑢 1𝑃 + 𝑢 2𝑄
= 𝑢1𝑃 + 𝑢2𝑑 × 𝑃
= (𝑢1 + 𝑢 2 d) × P
= (𝑒 × 𝑠𝑖𝑔2−1 + 𝑠𝑖𝑔1 × 𝑠𝑖𝑔2−1 𝑑) × 𝑃
= (𝑒 + 𝑠𝑖𝑔1 𝑑)𝑠𝑖𝑔2−1 × 𝑃
= (𝑒 + 𝑠𝑖𝑔1 𝑑) (𝑒 + 𝑠𝑖𝑔1 𝑑)−1 (𝑘 −1 )−1 × 𝑃 = 𝑘𝑃
Thus from the computation it is verified 𝑠𝑖𝑔1 = 𝑥 2 mod n from point 𝑋 = 𝑘𝑃.
From all the above algorithms, it can be seen that scalar multiplication is the main
computation involved in elliptic curve cryptography. SCAs mainly target the scalar
multiplication in ECC to compromise partial or the full secret key.
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CHAPTER III
SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS
To consider a cryptosystem under mathematically circumstances, a black-box
model is usually used. In the black-box scheme, attackers cannot get any intermed iate
computation results [15]. The only information available to the attackers are plaintext and
cipher text. Thus in order to break the cryptosystem, the attackers need to solve the hard
math problem such like ECDLP in ECC.

Figure 3.1 Traditional cryptosystem
However, such model is not adequate under most scenarios in practice. When a
cryptosystem is implemented on hardware, there will be unintended information leaked
during the execution of the algorithm. The attackers thus can try to find correlation between
the leaked information and the secret key. Side Channel can be classified based on the types
of side channel information. Information can be extracted from timing, power consumptio n
or electromagnetic radiation features. Hardware or software faults, computational errors,
and changes in frequency or temperature can also lead to leak of information. Table 3.1
shows the relation between leaked information and type of side channel attacks.

15

Side Channel Information

Side Channel Attacks
Simple power analysis(SPA)

Power traces

Differential power analysis
Comparative power analysis

Time

Timing attack

Faults and error

Fault attack

Electromagnetic radiation

EM attack

Table 3.1 Category of SCAs
3.1 Timing Attack
Many of the implementations

of cryptographic

algorithms

perform

the

computations in a non-constant time. The time variations sometimes can become a
breakthrough point of the system. If the difference of time is correlated to the secret
parameters, then a statistical analysis can reveal enough information to access the key.
Timing attack was first introduced by Kocher in [5].
The working principle of timing attack is to capitalize on the time difference, thus
an easy countermeasure is to make the implementation on the hardware equalize the
computation time in each step.
3.2 Fault Attack
The idea of fault attack is to inject a fault and force the system to leak informa tio n
related to the secret parameter. Fault attack was first introduced in [16]. Consider a
hardware implementation of a cryptosystem, the execution of a fault attack usually two
steps [17]. The first step is to inject a fault and the second step is to do a cryptanalys is
based on the erroneously result.
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Among the many fault attacks, differential fault attack (DFA) caught most attention
of the scientists and researchers. To initialize DFA, a bit error is enforced into the hardware
before or during the computation. By analyzing the correct result and the erroneous result,
the information of the secret key is compromised. Biehl and Műller proposed an effective
DFA against ECC in 2000 [18]. The main idea is to construct a reference elliptic curve Er
and choose a reference point 𝑃𝑟 on the Curve. By inputting this reference point into the
tamper-proof hardware, the reference result 𝑑 × 𝑃𝑟 on the curve is 𝐸𝑟 computed. Since
curve 𝐸𝑟 is carefully chosen that the order of the curve has a factor 𝑟 equals to the order of
𝑃𝑟 , the ECDLP is deduced to the subgroup of order 𝑟. Next another reference point is
carefully chosen and the whole process is duplicated. The secret parameter 𝑑 can be
revealed.
Yen and Joye introduced another fault attack scheme in [19], this attack targets the
algorithms with dummy operations. By carefully timing a fault injection, the attacker can
distinguish whether this fault causes an error in the result. Thus it can be known whether a
redundant operation is executed. By repeating the procedure, the whole secret key can be
retrieved. This attack is called safe-error attack.
3.3 Electromagnetic Attack
Electromagnetic (EM) attack [20] is based on the fact that all electrical device
radiates electromagnetic waves when operating. An adversary examines the changes of the
electromagnetic field first and then an electromagnetic analysis is executed trying to extract
the secret information.
Wu and Yu introduced an EM attack against scalar multiplication in [21]. The
attacker is targeting a classical binary algorithm. The electromagnetic traces captured have
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significant difference when different computation is executed. Thus it is easy to access the
secret key by comparing the power traces.
3.4 Power Analysis Attack
Similar to EM attacks, power consumption is often leaked during the running
process of the cryptographic device. By observing the power traces, attackers can get
access to the information on where a certain operation happened and what secret parameter
is involved. Since power analysis attacks usually use little resources, power constrained
applications such like smart cards are primary targets of it [22].
Power analysis attack can be generally categorized into two types, simple power
analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA). SPA attacker examines the power
traces of cryptography computations and distinguish the power consumption caused by the
secret key. The attacker tries to get secret information by observation of repetitive patterns
in the obtained power traces. If power consumptions are distinguishable the information of
secret key is leaked. DPA relies on the statistical analysis to reveal the correlation between
the secret bit and power consumption. It is usually executed in two steps. First the power
traces are captured, then analysis regarding the captured information is carried out. Among
all the various SCAs, DPA is being regarded as one of the strongest. The difference lies in
that despite merely observation of the power spectrum, DPAs employ more statistica l
methods to guess the secret key.
Coron shows in [7] how DPAs work against scalar multiplication, which is the main
computation in ECC. Since in many scalar multiplication algorithms, the result is computed
by continuous point addition chain. That is, given a point 𝑃 and scalar 𝑑, 𝑑𝑃 is calculated
as:
18

𝑃 → 𝑑0 𝑃 → 𝑑1 𝑃 → 𝑑2 𝑃 → 𝑑3 𝑃 → ⋯ → 𝑑𝑃
The attacker starts guessing from 𝑑0 = 1 to 𝑑. For each 𝑑𝑖 , a set 𝐴𝑖 with all possible 𝑑𝑖 =
𝑑𝑗 + 𝑑𝑘 where 0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑘 < 𝑖 is built. For each element 𝑑𝑖 in the set 𝐴𝑖 , the correlation
of power consumption and 𝑑𝑖 𝑃 is computed. When the peak is achieved in the computatio n,
the desired 𝑑𝑖 is recovered. By repeating the same pattern for 𝑑0 = 1 to 𝑑, the secret key
𝑑 will be compromised at last.
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CHAPTER IV
EXISTING WORK REVIEW AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
There have been different scalar multiplication algorithms existing to improve the
overall performance for efficient or security. In this chapter we introduce the differe nt
algorithms and their implementations. Also the security strength of these algorithms will
be analyzed.
4.1 Classical binary algorithm
The binary algorithm is also known as the “square and multiply method” to do
exponentiation calculation. It is a very old algorithm which has over 2000 year’s history
[23]. While in the scalar multiplication scenario, it is very simply adapted as the double
and add algorithm.
The basic idea of double and add algorithm is to make full use of the binary form
of the scalar. Consider a point 𝑃 and scalar 𝑘, rather than add point 𝑃 to itself 𝑑 times to
get the result 𝑘𝑃, the double and add method will obviously reduce number of addition
operation needed.
The binary algorithm has two versions, one is from the least significant bit to the
most significant bit shown in Algorithm 4.1.
Algorithm 4.1.Right to left version of double-and-add method
Input: 𝑃 𝜖 𝐸, 𝑘 = (𝑘𝑛−1 , … , 𝑘1 , 𝑘0 )2 , 𝑘𝑖 𝜖 0,1
Output: 𝑄 = 𝑘𝑃 𝜖 𝐸
Step 1: 𝑥 = 𝑂, 𝑦 = 𝑃;
Step 2: 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖=0 𝑡𝑜 𝑛−1 𝑑𝑜
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Step 3: 𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖 = 1, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑥 = 𝑥 + 𝑦
Step 4: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓
Step 5: 𝑦 = 2𝑦
Step 6: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟
Step 7:𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑥

The other is calculating from the most significant bit to the least significant bit, as
shown in algorithm 4.2.
Algorithm 4.2.Left to right version of double-and-add method
Input: 𝑃 𝜖 𝐸, 𝑘 = (𝑘𝑛−1 , … , 𝑘1 , 𝑘0 )2 , 𝑘𝑖 𝜖 0,1
Output: 𝑄 = 𝑘𝑃 𝜖 𝐸
Step 1: 𝑥 = 𝑃;
Step 2: 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖=𝑛−2 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑡𝑜 0 𝑑𝑜
Step 3:

𝑥 = 2𝑥

Step 4:

𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖 = 1, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑥 = 𝑥 + 𝑃

Step 5:

𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓

Step 6: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟
Step 7: 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑥

Although the addition operation is significantly reduced in the double-and-add
algorithm, the drawbacks of this algorithm is crucial. Comparing the operations carried out
when the secret bit 𝑘𝑖 is different, it is clear that more computations are executed when
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𝑘𝑖 = 1. In every iteration, the doubling operation is always performed, while addition only
happens when 𝑘𝑖 = 1. This variation responses directly into the power consumption. As
shown in Figure 4.1, D denotes doubling operation and A represents addition operation.
The secret bit is chosen as 𝑘 = (0101)2 . The length of the power peak is different, thus
the attacker can observe the power traces and distinguish the secret bits. This figure shows
exactly how the double-and-add algorithm is vulnerable to the SPA attack. Because of this
major drawback, many other algorithms is have been developed.

A: Addition
D: Doubling

A

D
D

D

A

D

Power Trace

Secret Bit

0

1

0

1

Figure 4.1 Vulnerability of binary method to SPA
A high speed ECC processor is implemented by Hossain and Kong in 2015 [24].
Over field 𝐺𝐹(2233 ), their ECC processor can perform scalar multiplication 2.66 ms at
255.66 MHz in on a Xilinx Kintex-7 devices. This design features to speed up the overall
computation time. They applies the double-and-add algorithm to the design in a trade-off
for speed. As stated previously, this design can be easily crack by SCA attacks.
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4.2 Double-and-Add Always Algorithm
In order to achieve more security strength against SPA, Coron proposed a double-and-add
always algorithm in 1999 [7]. The main idea of this algorithm is to add a dummy operation
to standard double-and-add to equalize the power consumption of each cycle. As illustrated
in Algorithm 4.3, a dummy addition is executed when the processing bit is zero. In this
way, the algorithm is performing a doubling followed by an addition in every iteration.
Since the algorithm is regular now, it has resistance to SPA attacks.
Algorithm 4.3.Double-and-add always method
Input: 𝑃 𝜖 𝐸, 𝑘 = (𝑘𝑛−1 , … , 𝑘1 , 𝑘0 )2 , 𝑘𝑖 𝜖 0,1
Output: 𝑄 = 𝑘𝑃 𝜖 𝐸
Step 1: 𝑥 = 𝑂, 𝑦 = 𝑂;
Step 2: 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖=𝑛−1 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑡𝑜 0 𝑑𝑜
Step 3:

𝑥 = 2𝑥;

Step 4:

𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑃;

Step 5: 𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖 = 1, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑥 = 𝑦;
Step 6: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓
Step 7: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟
Step 8: 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑥

However, another fault attack called c-safe error attack [9] can easily crack this
algorithm. When the secret bit is zero, the addition result won’t affect the final result. When
the attacker altered one bit of the secret key to zero, the result can be compared with the
original output. If the result remains the same, the attacker knows that the secret bit is zero.
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In the case the result changed, the attacker will figure that the secret bit is one and it is quite
easy to locate. This algorithm is taking as an unsuccessful sequence mask example since
the countermeasure takes to prevent SPA benefits other attacks [26].
Another attack threatening this algorithm is the doubling attack, which proposed by
Fouque and Valette in [25]. The name is from the fact this attack is based on the doubling
operation in the scalar multiplication. This type of attack only works when using left to
right algorithms. To better explain it, consider two points 𝑃, 2𝑃 and secret 𝑘 = 9 =
(1001)2 as input. Double-and-add always method is used to compute 𝑘𝑃 and 𝑘 (2𝑃). As
illustrated in Table 4.1, if we focus the doubling operation in each iteration, some of them
shares the same pattern. To be more specific, doubling operation at iteration 2 calculating
𝑘 (2𝑃) is the same as doubling operation at iteration 3 calculating 𝑘𝑃. Thus two zeros is
overserved by the adversary. This attack reveals all the bits with the value zero and using
these information, the whole secret bits can be revealed consequently.
Table 4.1 Doubling attack against double-and-add always algorithm
Iteration 𝑖

𝑘𝑖

𝑘𝑃

𝑘(2𝑃)

3

1

2 × 0
0 + 𝑃

2 × 0
0 + 2𝑃

2

0

2 × 𝑃
2𝑃 + 𝑃

2 × 2𝑃
4𝑃 + 2𝑃

1

0

2 × 2𝑃
4𝑃 + 𝑃

2 × 4𝑃
8𝑃 + 2𝑃

0

1

2 × 4𝑃
8𝑃 + 𝑃

2 × 8𝑃
16𝑃 + 2𝑃

To the best knowledge, implementation for double-and-add always algorithm is
very few since it is not efficiency compared to classical double-and-add. Although it has
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more resistance to SPA, it is still vulnerable to many other attacks such like safe error
attack. This method later stimulated development of more advanced algorithms such like
MPL.
4.3 Non Adjacent Form Method
As stated in previous chapter, a point 𝑃 (𝑥, 𝑦) on elliptic curve E over binary field,
has additive inverse in the form – 𝑃 = (𝑥, 𝑥 + 𝑦). Thus subtraction of point is actually the
same as point addition on an elliptic curve. The non-adjacent form (NAF) is a signed digit
representation [27] inspired by this fact. In NAF method, the secret key is represented by
the following equation.

𝑙 −1

𝑘=∑
𝑖 =0

𝑘𝑖 2𝑖 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑘𝑖 ∈ {0, ±1}, 𝑘𝑙−1 ≠ 0

In this expression, there is no two continuous nonzero digits. The advantage of this
representation is that generally it has fewer nonzero bits [23], which leads to a reduction of
addition operation needed in the algorithm. The NAF method is shown in Algorithm 4.4.

Algorithm 4.4. Non Adjacent Form method
𝑙−1

Input: 𝑃 𝜖 𝐸, 𝑁𝐴𝐹(𝑘) = ∑

𝑘𝑖 2𝑖 , 𝑘𝑖 𝜖 {0, ±1}

𝑖=0

Output: 𝑄 = 𝑘𝑃 𝜖 𝐸
Step 1: 𝑥 = 𝑃, 𝑦 = 𝑂;
Step 2: 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖=l−2 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑡𝑜 0 𝑑𝑜
Step 3:

𝑥 = 2𝑥;
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Step 4: 𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖 = 1, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑥 = 𝑥 + 𝑃;
Step 5: else 𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖 = −1, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑥 = 𝑥 + (−𝑃);
Step 6: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓
Step 7: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟
Step 8: 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑥

The doubling attack mentioned in previous section still applies to the NAF method.
Taking an integer 𝑘 = 29, and 𝑁𝐴𝐹 (𝑘) = (1, 0, 0 − 1, 0, 1) . Then if the adversary
calculates 𝑘𝑃 and takes 𝑘 (2𝑃) as a reference. From Table. 4.2, it is shown that the
intermediate value at iteration i when computing 𝑘 (2𝑃) equals the result at iteration i-1
when computing 𝑘𝑃 . All the secret bits with value zero is thus revealed. Since
approximately two third of the bits in NAF representation is zero [28], most bits are
retrieved applying doubling attack.
Table 4.2 Doubling attack against NAF method
Iteration 𝑖

𝑘𝑖

𝑘𝑃

𝑘(2𝑃)

4

0

2×𝑃

2 × 2𝑃

3

0

2 × 2𝑃

2 × 4𝑃

2

−1

2 × 4𝑃
8𝑃 + (−𝑃)

2 × 8𝑃
16𝑃 + (−2𝑃)

1

0

2 × 7𝑃

2 × 14𝑃

0

1

2 × 14𝑃
28𝑃 + 𝑃

2 × 28𝑃
56𝑃 + 2𝑃
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Wang introduced his implementation of an ECC coprocessor over 𝐺𝐹(2233 ) in
2005 [29]. In this paper, a digit-serial multiplier which can achieve half or quarter clock
cycles compared to the full-serial multiplier is proposed. With proper precomputation, this
design can reduce the total calculating time by applying the projective coordinates. The
coprocessor can perform a scalar multiplication in 2.28 ms at 80 MHz. However, the
implementation algorithm chosen by the author is NAF method which vulnerable to attacks
like doubling attack.
4.4 Montgomery Powering Ladder Algorithm
4.4.1 Explanation of Algorithm
The Montgomery powering ladder is first proposed in [9] to provide a
𝑖
countermeasure to SPA. For a given 𝑘 = ∑𝑙𝑖 −1
=0 𝑘𝑖 2 , in order to compute 𝑘𝑃, the MPL is
𝑖
constructed based on the following relationships. Define 𝐿𝑗 = ∑𝑙−1
𝑖=𝑗 𝑘𝑖 2 and 𝐻𝑗 = 𝐿𝑗 + 1.

𝐿𝑗 and 𝐻𝑗 can then be represented as
{

𝐿𝑗 = 2𝐿𝑗+1 + 𝑘𝑗 = 𝐿𝑗+1 + 𝐻𝑗+1 + 𝑘𝑗 − 1.
𝐻𝑗 = 𝐿𝑗+1 + 𝐻𝑗+1 + 𝑘𝑗

So at iteration 𝑗, it is easy to express 𝐿𝑗 and 𝐻𝑗 using the previous values from iteration 𝑗 +
1
(𝐿𝑗 , 𝐻𝑗 ) = {

(2𝐿𝑗+1 , 𝐿𝑗+1 + 𝐻𝑗+1 ) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑘𝑗 = 0
(𝐿𝑗+1 + 𝐻𝑗+1 , 2𝐻𝑗+1 ) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑘𝑗 = 1

The above equations implies the structure of MPL. The calculations are very similar to
each other and in each iteration one doubling is performed with one addition. Recall that
the main computation of scalar multiplication is point doubling and point addition, the
following algorithm is obtained.
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Algorithm 4.5. Montgomery Powering Ladder
Input: 𝑃 𝜖 𝐸, 𝑘 = (𝑘𝑛−1 , … , 𝑘1 , 𝑘0 )2 , 𝑘𝑖 𝜖 0,1
Output: 𝑄 = 𝑘𝑃 𝜖 𝐸
Step 1: 𝑥 = 0, 𝑦 = 𝑃;
Step 2: 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖=𝑛−1 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑡𝑜 0 𝑑𝑜
Step 3:

𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖 = 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑦; 𝑥 = 2𝑥

Step 4: 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖 = 1, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑥 = 𝑥 + 𝑦; 𝑦 = 2𝑦
Step 5: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓
Step 6: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟
Step 7: 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑥

4.4.2 Advantage of MPL
In algorithm 4.5, it is obvious that the computations for point addition and point
doubling are independent. Thus they can be calculated parallel. This feature results in faster
calculation speed. Moreover, since in every circle, MPL executes the same operation, it is
considered highly regular. This structure makes it invulnerable to SPA.
Another c safe-error attack introduced in previous section also has no effect to MPL.
Unlike the double-and-add always algorithm, there is no dummy operation in MPL. So any
fault injected will lead an error in the result.
The doubling attack is considered ineffective. Assume there are two registers 𝑅0
and 𝑅1 to store the intermediate values. It could be the value stored in 𝑅0 or 𝑅1 performs
the doubling, depending on the secret bit. While the previous algorithms which are
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vulnerable to doubling attack all shares the fixed doubling pattern, the attacker cannot see
a repeated doubling operation when there is no continuous bits with the same value one or
zero. But if there exists successive bits carrying the same value, the algorithm is vulnerab le
to a relative doubling attack proposed in [30].
4.4.3 Relative Doubling Attack against MPL
While the doubling attack mainly focus on finding the 0 bits, the relative doubling
attack compares the value of two adjacent secret key bits. Let registers 𝑅0 store the value
of 𝐿 𝑖, and registers 𝑅1 store the value of 𝐻𝑖 . If 𝑘𝑖 = 𝑘𝑖 −1 = 0, the following doubling
computation is observed.
𝑅 ← 2 × 𝐿 𝑖 𝑃: 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 − 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑘𝑃
{ 0
𝑅0 ← 𝐿 𝑖+1 × 2𝑃: 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑘(2𝑃)
Since 𝐿 𝑖 = 2𝐿 𝑖+1 when obviously the above equations are doing the same
computation. Thus, if such collisions are observed, the attacker get the information
𝑘𝑖 = 𝑘𝑖−1 = 0.
Similar situation applies to when 𝑘𝑖 = 𝑘𝑖 −1 = 1. Then in register 𝑅1 ,
𝑅 ← 2 × 𝐻𝑖 𝑃: 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 − 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑘𝑃
{ 1
𝑅1 ← 𝐻𝑖+1 × 2𝑃: 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑘(2𝑃)
same computations will be carried because that 𝐻𝑖 = 2𝐻𝑖+1 . While when ki is not equal to
𝑘𝑖−1 , there is no collision detected.
Taking 𝑘 = 105 = (1101001)2, the adversary computes 𝑘𝑃 and 𝑘(2𝑃) as the
pattern shown in Table. 4.3. It is very clear that at iteration 1 and 2, collisions in register
𝑅0 is detected. This fact leads to secret key bits 𝑘2 = 𝑘1 = 0. Taking iteration 5 and 6 as
another example, the operations regarding values in register 𝑅1 is the same, thus the
attacker figures 𝑘6 = 𝑘5 = 0. When there is no collision happened, that means the two
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adjacent secret bits are holding different values. Then the whole secret key is revealed from
the collision location bit by bit.
Table 4.3 Relative doubling attack against MPL
Iteration 𝑖

𝑘𝑖

𝑘𝑃

𝑘(2𝑃)

6

1

𝑅0 = 0 + 𝑃
𝑅1 = 2 × 𝑃

𝑅0 = 0 + 2𝑃
𝑅1 = 2 × 2𝑃

5

1

𝑅0 = 𝑃 + 2𝑃
𝑅1 = 2 × 2𝑃

𝑅0 = 2𝑃 + 4𝑃
𝑅1 = 2 × 4𝑃

4

0

𝑅0 = 2 × 3𝑃
𝑅1 = 3𝑃 + 4𝑃

𝑅0 = 2 × 6𝑃
𝑅1 = 6𝑃 + 8𝑃

3

1

𝑅0 = 6𝑃 + 7𝑃
𝑅1 = 2 × 7𝑃

𝑅0 = 12𝑃 + 14𝑃
𝑅1 = 2 × 14𝑃

2

0

𝑅0 = 2 × 13𝑃
𝑅1 = 13𝑃 + 14𝑃

𝑅0 = 2 × 26𝑃
𝑅1 = 26𝑃 + 28𝑃

1

0

𝑅0 = 2 × 26𝑃
𝑅1 = 26𝑃 + 27𝑃

𝑅0 = 2 × 52𝑃
𝑅1 = 52𝑃 + 54𝑃

0

1

𝑅0 = 52𝑃 + 53𝑃
𝑅1 = 2 × 53𝑃

𝑅0 = 104𝑃 + 106𝑃
𝑅1 = 2 × 106𝑃

4.4.4 M-safe Error Attack against MPL
Despite the relative doubling attack, another fault attack M safe-error attack
introduced in [19] is also proven to be effective against MPL. In this scheme, the fault
induced by the attacker is temporary memory fault and it is very carefully timed. M safeerror attack takes advantage of the two distinct operations carried out in each cycle of MPL.
Consider the different computation when 𝑘 𝑖 is different. When 𝑘 𝑖 = 1 , the two
operations are 𝑅0 = 𝑅0 + 𝑅1 and 𝑅1 = 2𝑅1 . Any fault injected into 𝑅1 will change the
value of the result, thus it is not a safe error. If 𝑘 𝑖 = 0, then 𝑅0 = 2𝑅0 and 𝑅1 = 𝑅0 +
𝑅1 will be computed, error inputted into more significant bits of 𝑅1 will be erased after the
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resigning of value in 𝑅1 . In other words, the result still remains and the error is regarded a
safe-error. The attacker can retrieve the secret bit 𝑘 𝑖 based on the above fact.
4.4.5 Comparative Power Analysis against MPL
Comparative Power Analysis is proposed by Homma in 2010 [31]. It is a more
powerful attack which can compromise multiple scalar multiplication algorithms such like
double-and-add algorithm, double-and-add always algorithm and MPL algorithm. While
the original attack introduced is aiming at implementation of exponentiation, it also applies
to scalar multiplication.
Similar to the relative doubling attack, the basic idea of comparative power analysis
is also generating collisions by inputting a pair of carefully chosen message. More
specifically, the chosen inputs are set to satisfy the equation 𝛼𝑃 = 𝛽𝑄, where 𝛼 and 𝛽 are
integer. The input 𝑃 is computed with the target operation 𝛼𝑃 while the input 𝑄 is
illustrates the reference power trace. When the collision happens, the doubling operation
of the two input will have very similar power trace. By comparison of the power traces, the
target secret key bit is leaked. Unlike doubling attack, the collision can be retrieved from
different time frames.
Figure 4.2 shows an example how the attack scheme works. The input condition is
chosen as 15𝑃 = 2𝑄. Consider the first four bits of the secret key is known to the attacker,
the target bit is the fifth bit. The attacker then make an assumption that the target bit is 1,
and illustrates the power traces. Then he examines the reference power traces at the time
frame 2𝑄 doubling is computing, if the power trace shares similarity with the target power
trace at the time frame computing 15𝑃 doubling, the target secret bit is 1. The assumptio n
made at the beginning is correct. If there is no similarity detected in the target and reference
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power trace, the secret bit is 0. Note that the collision is generated at different timefra me
of the two power traces. By repeating the attack pattern, all the bits of the secret key will
be known.

Figure 4.2 Comparative power analysis against MPL
4.4.6 MPL based hardware implementation
Deschamps and G.Sutter implemented EC scalar multiplication over 𝐺𝐹(2163 ) in
2008 [32]. This design is implemented using MPL algorithm. The computation time is 1ms
at 100MHz and a comparison with binary algorithm implementation has been made. As
stated previously, implementation on unprotected MPL is still vulnerable to some SCAs,
thus an implementation on a more secure algorithm is proposed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS OF MODIFIED MPL WITH COUNTERMEASURES
In this chapter we introduce a modified MPL with sequence masking, exponent
splitting and point randomization proposed in [11]. A small modification has been done to
this algorithm to make it suitable for ECC scalar multiplication since it is origina lly
invented for exponentiation operation.
5.1 Existing countermeasure techniques
In previous Chapters, it has been stated that unprotected MPL is still vulnerable to
a lot of side channel attacks. To offer protections in algorithm level, He, Huang and Wu
proposed a highly secure MPL for exponentiation operation [11]. Several countermeas ures
had been applied to enhance its security strength.
5.1.1 Coron’s three countermeasures to DPA
Coron has proposed three countermeasures against DPA to improve the origina l
MPL [7]. The first is to randomize the secret private exponent. The main idea is to change
the representation of the secret exponent. Denote #ε as the number of all the points on the
curve E, and select a random number k. Then the following computation is carried out to
calculate 𝑑 ′ = 𝑑 + 𝑘#𝜀, the computation Q = dP is replaced by 𝑄 = 𝑑′𝑃. The correctness
of this transform is based on the fact that #𝜀𝑃 = 0. To expand this equation in detail, we
get the following proof.
𝑄 = 𝑑 ′ 𝑃 = (𝑑 + 𝑘. #𝜀 )𝑃 = 𝑑𝑃 + 𝑘. #𝜀. 𝑃 = 𝑑𝑃 + 𝛰 = 𝑑𝑃
The size of the random number k is suggested to be 20 for better security performance. By
applying this countermeasure, the compute process is changed while the result 𝑄 still
remains the same.
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The second countermeasure is to blind the point 𝑃. Choose a random 𝑅 on the same
curve as point 𝑃. Point 𝑅 is used as a mask to provide protection to the point 𝑃. Another
point 𝑆 is computed as 𝑆 = 𝑑𝑅 . The cryptographic system then performs the scalar
multiplication 𝑑(𝑅 + 𝑃). In order to retrieve 𝑄 = 𝑑𝑃, a subtraction will be applied the
previous result. Since 𝑆 is already known, the final result will be recovered by 𝑑(𝑅 + 𝑃) −
𝑆. Point 𝑅 and 𝑆 will be updated in every initialization of the scalar multiplication.
The third countermeasure is to randomize to projective representation [33] of the
point 𝑃 (𝑥, 𝑦). Point 𝑃 can be represented in projective coordinates as (𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑍). Since it is
not the only projective representation point P has, it can be written as (𝜆𝑋, 𝜆𝑌, 𝜆𝑍) where
𝜆 ≠ 0. The binary representation of point 𝑃 is then guarded. Since this thesis mainly focus
on implementation in affine coordinates, this countermeasure will not be discussed in detail.
5.1.2 Exponent Splitting
Exponent Splitting technique is first proposed in [34]. While it is used in
exponentiation is the paper, the idea is the same in scalar multiplication. The basic thought
is based on the simple observation that
𝑑𝑃 = (𝑑 − 𝑎)𝑃 + 𝑎𝑃
In this splitting technique, the scalar d can be split into two parts as the above
equation indicated. First a random number 𝑟 is generated, where r is smaller than 𝑑. 𝑟’ is
then calculated by 𝑟’ = 𝑑 − 𝑟. The scalar multiplication then become
𝑑𝑃 = 𝑟𝑃 + 𝑟’𝑃
since 𝑑 = 𝑟 + 𝑟’, it is obvious that the result is the same without scalar splitting.
Since we can see from the equation, the splitting technique is basically transforming
a single scalar multiplication into two separate computations, thus it will be more time
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consuming to put this technique into practice. Usually it takes two times the original time.
But considering the security strength, sometimes the trade-off is worthy. This technique
offers enhanced protection against SPA, and the randomization also helps to prevent some
differential attacks.
5.1.3 Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation
This technique is first proposed by Fumaroli and Vigilant in [35]. It is an extension
of Coron’s second countermeasure [7]. The main idea is to add a mask to the base point 𝑃
to construct a masked MPL. The algorithm is originally for exponentiation operation, but
by a small modification, it can be also applied to scalar multiplication.
Algorithm 5.1. Masked Montgomery Powering Ladder
Input: 𝑃 𝜖 𝐸, 𝑘 = (𝑘𝑛−1 , … , 𝑘1 , 𝑘0 )2 , 𝑘𝑖 𝜖 0,1
Output: 𝑄 = 𝑘𝑃 𝜖 𝐸
Step 1: 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑅 𝑜𝑛 𝐸;
Step 2: 𝑅0 = 𝑅, 𝑅1 = 𝑃 + 𝑅, 𝑅2 = −𝑅
Step 3: 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖=𝑛−1 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑡𝑜 0 𝑑𝑜
Step 4:

𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖 = 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑅1 = 𝑅0 + 𝑅1 ; 𝑅0 = 2𝑅0 ; 𝑅2 = 2𝑅2

Step 5: 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖 = 1, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑅0 = 𝑅0 + 𝑅1 ; 𝑅1 = 2𝑅1 ; 𝑅2 = 2𝑅2
Step 6: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓
Step 7: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟
Step 8: 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑄 = 𝑅0 + 𝑅2

In Algorithm 5.1, at the beginning of the operation, a random point 𝑅 is picked. 𝑅
is acting as a mask to the base point 𝑃. Three registers 𝑅0 , 𝑅1 , 𝑅2 are needed for the
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algorithm. 𝑅0 is initialised with the mask 𝑅, 𝑅1 is initialised with 𝑃 + 𝑅 and 𝑅2 is given
the anti-mask – 𝑅. The mask is updated at each iteration. The intimid ate values in 𝑅0 and
𝑅1 are blinded with the updated mask 2𝑛−𝑖 𝑅. The anti-mask value is also updated at every
iteration. The value in register 𝑅2 is following the pattern 2𝑛−𝑖 (−𝑅). At the end of the
computation, the final unmask step will be executed to recover the original desired result.
This algorithm can provide resistance to more attacks while still keeps the feature
that regular MPL offers. Since the regular MPL is highly regular, the algorithm is
insensitive to SPA. As the mask technique is applied in this algorithm, the intermed iate
values are independent from the input and output according to [35]. Thus the attacker
cannot exploited the secret key by DPA. Moreover, since any fault injected during any time
of the computation will cause the change of the temporary result. The adversary cannot
retrieve valuable information regarding the secret key bit.
5.2 Security Analysis of Existing Countermeasure Techniques
Although the techniques introduced in previous section are great improvement to
the strength of existing algorithms. They still face security challenge stand alone.
5.2.1 High-Order Attack
The high-order attack is first proposed by Muller and Valette in [36]. This attack is
specifically derived from the statistical property of the exponent splitting. Although 𝑟 is a
randomly selected number, the pair (𝑟, 𝑟’) is not uniformly distributed since they satisfy
𝑑 = 𝑟 + 𝑟’.
If the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ bits of 𝑟, 𝑟’ and 𝑑 is denoted as 𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 ’ and 𝑑𝑖 , 𝐶𝑖 representing the carry
bit generated at the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ iteration. The following equation is satisfied.
𝐶𝑖 ⨁𝑟𝑖 ⨁𝑟𝑖 ′ = 𝑑𝑖
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Let 𝑃𝑖 be the probability that the carry bit is zero, and 𝑃𝑟 is set to be the probability the pair
(𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 ’) be a certain value. In the case 𝑑𝑖 = 0 and 𝐶𝑖 = 0, the probability for the pair
(𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 ’) holds the value (0,0) or (1,1) is the same. When the value is (0, 0), it is easy to
get 𝐶𝑖+1 = 0. On the contrary, 𝐶𝑖+1 = 1. The same rules apply when 𝑑𝑖 = 1 . Table. 5.1
shows the transition of the probability. The probabilities of iteration 𝑖 is generated from the
previous iteration 𝑖 − 1. It is a Markov chain.

Table 5.1 Probability transition when di = 0 or 1
𝑃𝑟 (𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 ’)

𝑑𝑖 = 0

𝑑𝑖 = 1

𝑃𝑟 (0,0)

0.5 × 𝑃𝑖

0.5 × (1 − 𝑃𝑖)

𝑃𝑟 (0,1)

0.5 × (1 − 𝑃𝑖)

0.5 × 𝑃𝑖

𝑃𝑟 (1,0)

0.5 × (1 − 𝑃𝑖)

0.5 × 𝑃𝑖

𝑃𝑟 (1,1)

0.5 × 𝑃𝑖

0.5 × (1 − 𝑃𝑖)

𝑃𝑖+1

0.5 × 𝑃𝑖

0.5 × (1 + 𝑃𝑖)

An example in [36] illustrates the idea of how this attack works. A secret 𝑑 with
length 24 bits is chosen and the probability distribution of the pair (𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 ’) is computed in
Table.5.2. The table shows whenever the secret bit d has a long run of 0s or 1s, it is very
likely the randomly generated pair (𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 ’) hold different value. Taking the probability
transition illustrated in Table.5.1 into account, the probability of 𝑃𝑖 can be calculated. In
the case the secret bit is running long 0s (from 𝑑7 to 𝑑11 in the table), 𝑃𝑖 is approaching 0
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Table 5.2 An example of bit-level imbalance [36]
𝑑0

𝑑1

𝑑2

… … 𝑑7

𝑑8

𝑑9

𝑑10 𝑑11 … … 𝑑18 𝑑19 𝑑20 𝑑21 𝑑22 𝑑23

0

1

0

…… 0

0

0

0

0

…… 0

1

1

1

1

1

𝑃𝑟 (0,0) 50

25

38

… … 16

8

4

2

1

…… 8

47

23

11

5

2

𝑃𝑟 (1,0) 0

25

12

… … 34

41

46

48

49

… … 42

3

27

39

45

48

𝑃𝑟 (0,1) 0

25

13

… … 33

42

46

49

49

… … 43

4

28

40

46

49

𝑃𝑟 (1,1) 50

25

37

… … 17

9

4

1

1

…… 7

46

22

10

4

1

(𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖’)

indicating that there is no carry bit generated. While in the case of continuous 1s (from d19
to d23 in the table), 𝑃𝑖 gets very close to 1, shows that the carry bit is propagating as the
computation runs. If the attacker can launch an attack revealing the probabilities of the pair
(𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 ’), he can proceed to find information regarding the secret bit. The secret bit will no
longer be secret.
5.2.2 Template Attack
Template attack [37] is based on the fact that power consumptions can be
characterized by a multivariate normal distribution during the computations. Normally, it
can be executed in two steps. The first step is to setup the templates and the second step is
using the template to initialise attacks.
The multivariate normal distribution is defined by a covariance matrix C and a
mean vector m. Where C holds the covariance of the targeting point and m is the mean of
all the point on the trace. The pair (𝑚, 𝐶) is called the template. By sending in differe nt
data and key bit, a group of power trace is generated by the adversary. Until then, every
data and key pair leads to a template. Then as stated above, in the second step, the attacker
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compares the power trace from the target device with all the templates, and determine
which one has the highest probability to be the correct template. After the correct template
is recovered, the key is then retrieved.
Since in ECC scalar multiplication, the base point P is fixed. This observation offers
template attack a great opportunity. In [38], Herbst and Medwed proposed a template attack
scheme against masked MPL. In the scenario of scalar multiplication, the attacker set up
the templates by running the scalar multiplication several times using different input data.
The hamming weight of some intimidate values are also correlated. The power trace is then
obtained to match with the template. In order to simplify the matching process, the first
two multiplication of the base point are usually taken out to do the match. The template
with highest matching probability indicates the first bit. The mask technique only blinds
the point, but still by means of template attack, partial bits of secret k is recovered. The
attacker can then focus on the masking operation to determine the mask 𝑅 . Since the
hamming weight is known by the matching process. The mask 𝑅 will not be safe.
5.3 Modified MPL with SM, ES and PR
Since all the countermeasures listed in previous section is vulnerable to differe nt
attacks stand alone. He, Huang and Wu burrowed some of the ideas mentioned before and
combined them to create a more secure algorithm [11].
5.3.1 Algorithm Explanation
The new algorithm is illustrated as algorithm 5.2. The new algorithm is a
combination of three ideas. The sequence masking technique [11], exponent splitting [34]
and randomization of the message [35]. The combination of these three techniques greatly
improved the security strength of the MPL. Further protections are provided to the
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vulnerabilities stated in previous sections.
This algorithm works as follows, in the pre-computation phase, a random number
𝑘0 smaller than secret bit k is generated. The secret bit 𝑘 is divided into two parts, the first
part is the random number 𝑘0 , the second part is calculated as 𝑘1 = 𝑘 − 𝑘0 . After that a
random point 𝑅 on the same curve with point 𝑃 is generated. The point 𝑅 is acting as a
mask, it is initialized to all the registers and the value is updated in each iteration. Another
random number 𝑆 with the same bit size of secret key 𝑘 is generated afterwards. The
introduction of random number 𝑆 is acting as a switch, it determines which computation to
be executed. The original scalar multiplication is computed following each bit of 𝑘
sequentially. With the random number 𝑆, it turns into a randomly computed process.
Moving to the main iteration part of the algorithm, registers 𝑅0 and 𝑅1 holds the
values related to the secret bit 𝑘0 . While 𝑅2 and 𝑅3 store the values computed using 𝑘1 . As
introduced above, two scalar multiplications take turns to compute according to the current
bit of 𝑆. When the main iteration part is finished, a final adjustment adding the values in
𝑅0 and 𝑅2 is carried out to get the desired output.
The following observations proved the correctness of the algorithm easily. Let 𝑖
denotes the iteration number, the mask is updated following a pattern 2𝑖 𝑅. The first scalar
multiplication

generates

the intermediate

value

2𝑖 𝑅 + 𝑘0 𝑃 , the second scalar

multiplication holds that 2𝑖 (−𝑅) + (𝑘 − 𝑘0 )𝑃. Adding them up, we get the value of 𝑘𝑃.
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Algorithm 5.2. Modified MPL with SM, ES and PR
Input: 𝑃 𝜖 𝐸, 𝑘 = (𝑘 𝑛−1, … , 𝑘1 , 𝑘 0 )2 , 𝑘 𝑖 𝜖 0,1
Output: 𝑄 = 𝑘𝑃 𝜖 𝐸
Step 1: 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑅 𝑜𝑛 𝐸;
( 0)

( 0)

Step 2: 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑘 0 = (𝑘 𝑛−1 … 𝑘 0 )2 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑘 0𝜖 (1, 𝑘)
( 1)

( 1)

𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑘1 (𝑘 𝑛−1 … 𝑘 0 )2 = 𝑘 − 𝑘 0 ;
𝑘 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘1 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠
(0)

(0)

( 1)

( 1)

𝐷0 = (𝑑𝑛−1 … 𝑑0 )2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷1 = (𝑑𝑛−1 … 𝑑0 )2
Step 3: 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑛 𝑏𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 S = (𝑠𝑛−1 , … , 𝑠1 , 𝑠0 )2
Step 4: Set 𝑅 0 = 𝑅, 𝑅1 = 𝑃 + 𝑅, 𝑅2 = −𝑅, 𝑅 2 = 𝑃 + (−𝑅)
Step 5: 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖=𝑛−1 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑡𝑜 0 𝑑𝑜
Step 6:
Step 7:
Step 8:
Step 9:

𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑖 = 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛
(0)

𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑛−1 = 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑅1 = 𝑅0 + 𝑅1 ; 𝑅0 = 2𝑅 0 ;
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑅0 = 𝑅 0 + 𝑅1 ; 𝑅1 = 2𝑅1 ;
𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓; 𝐷0 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑏𝑦 1 𝑏𝑖𝑡.
(1)

Step 10: 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓𝑑𝑛−1 = 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑅3 = 𝑅 2 + 𝑅3 ;𝑅 2 = 2𝑅2;
Step 11:

𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑅2 = 𝑅2 + 𝑅 3; 𝑅 3 = 2𝑅3 ;

Step 12: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓; 𝐷1 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑏𝑦 1 𝑏𝑖𝑡.
Step 13: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓
Step 14: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟
Step 15: 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 𝑛 − 1 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑡𝑜 0 𝑑𝑜
Step 16:
Step 17:
Step 18:
Step 19:

𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑖 = 1, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛
(0)

𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑛−1 = 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑅1 = 𝑅0 + 𝑅1 ; 𝑅 0 = 2𝑅0 ;
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑅 0 = 𝑅0 + 𝑅1 ; 𝑅1 = 2𝑅1 ;
𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓; 𝐷0 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑏𝑦 1 𝑏𝑖𝑡.
(1)

Step 20: 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓𝑑𝑛−1 = 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑅3 = 𝑅 2 + 𝑅3 ;𝑅 2 = 2𝑅2;
Step 21:

𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑅2 = 𝑅2 + 𝑅 3; 𝑅 3 = 2𝑅3 ;

41

Step 22: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓; 𝐷1 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑏𝑦 1 𝑏𝑖𝑡.
Step 23: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓
Step 24: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟
Step 25: 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑅0 = 𝑅0 + 𝑅 2

5.3.2 Security Analysis
As mentioned in previous sections, this algorithm provides enhanced protection to
more attacks compared to existing algorithms.
Since algorithm 5.2 still holds the high regularity MPL offers, SPA is not effective
against it. The main computation part always compute a doubling and an addition
regardless the input bit. This it keeps all the resistance the regular MPL can provide. C-safe
error attack is also eliminated because there is no dummy operation in this modified MPL.
Taking M-safe error into account. In M-safe error attack scheme, the induced
memory fault need to be very carefully timed to determine whether it changed the result.
Even if the attacker reveals a secret bit by a successfully inducing a safe error, the whole
key pattern is not compromised since the key is divided into two parts. Moreover, the
computation is executed in a random order. Thus M-safe error cannot threat the modified
MPL.
Another attack mentioned above is the comparative power analysis, it also has little
effect on the modified MPL with SM, ES and PR. This attack scheme is very similar to the
relative doubling attack. Both the two attacks are trying to get two power traces and by
comparing them to get valuable information of the secret key. Since the secret key is
randomly divided into two parts in every initialization, the two power traces generated will
follow different key pattern. It is very hard to make a meaningful comparison between
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them. Even if a collision is observed, the mask applied to it in the precomputation will
make the power trace totally different. An example listed below in Fig.5.1 will better
explain the idea. The table above the power traces show the bits involved in the
computation. The top row is the randomly generated sequence s, it is different in every
initialization of the process. Below are the corresponding computation decided by sequence
𝑠. Secret bit 𝑘0 will be processed when current bit of sequence 𝑠 holds 0. Otherwise, secret
bit 𝑘1 will be computed. Only one of the two computations is carried out at the same time
frame.

Figure 5.1 Resistance of algorithm 5.2 to relative doubling attack
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Taken the adjacent bits in the blue box as the first comparison bit, the computatio n
involved is obviously different. But the adversary cannot easily say that the two bits are
different since the two computations are carried out using different key 𝑘0 and 𝑘1 , thus
comparisons like this will become pointless, it provides no useful information regarding
the secret bit. The second sample bits will be taken from the red boxes. Although the
unmasked computations are all 2𝑃 → 4𝑃, the adversary will still observe different power
traces since the mask is different as shown in Fig. 5.1. From above examples, the fact that
comparison between adjacent bits cannot offer any useful information is easily obtained.
Comparative power analysis shares similar scheme to relative doubling attack. It is also
ineffective since Algorithm 5.2 breaks the hidden relationship it relies on.
High-order attack is also worry free. When the attacker is trying to get enough
samples to analysis the probability of the imbalance statistic property, the first thing he
must do is to get access to the secret key. In the case of Algorithm 5.2, the secret key is
randomly divided into two parts. The attacker need to know both parts to start collet
samples and do the analysis, so high-order attack need to be combined with other attacks
to be effective. As already stated above, SPAs are stopped by the property of highly regular.
Relative doubling attack and comparative power analysis are of little use since every power
trace generated are randomized by the random sequence s. Fault attack will also be stopped.
Even though the attacker uses faults injected to one of the two scalar multiplications to
make the two scalar multiplication distinguishable, it is hard for him to find a non-fault
reference since all the intermediate values are masked. With above analysis, these attacks
mentioned cannot threat Algorithm 5.2. That leaves the last one, template attack.
By building Template attack can comparison the actual computation and the
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template and in Section 5.2.2, we introduced how the mask 𝑅 will be compromised.
Assume in Algorithm 5.2, the mask 𝑅 is known using template attack, then in order to
reveal the secret key, the attacker need to get the intermediate values. In other words, he
need to compute the updated mask 2𝑛−𝑖 𝑅. For the two scalar multiplications, the iteration
number 𝑖 is different. The iteration number is decided by the random sequence 𝑠, which
doesn't participate in any computations. It only acts like a switch to decide which scalar
multiplication to be computed. Thus even if the attacker retrieved the initial mask 𝑅, the
updated mask is still a big challenge. Algorithm 5.2 will still be secure.
With all the above analysis, we can see that Algorithm 5.2 is highly secure. It resists
SCAs, relative doubling attack, comparative power analysis, high-order attack and
template attack. It greatly enhanced the security strength of MPL from algorithm level.
Thus it is chosen as the implementation algorithm.
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CHAPTER VI
PROPOSED HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION
In this chapter, based on previous Algorithm 5.2, an efficient hardware architecture
is proposed and its FPGA implementation is presented. Very high speed integrated circuit
(VHSIC) Hardware Description Language is chosen as the target implementa tio n
language. A modern Xilinx Virtex 7 (XC7VX690TFFG1926-3) field-programmable gate
array (FPGA) device is used in the implementation. The ECC parameters are NISTrecommended elliptic curve for 𝐺𝐹(2233 ) in [39], as shown in Table. 6.1, where 𝑓 (𝑥 ) is
the irreducible polynomial, n is the order, 𝐺𝑥 and 𝐺𝑦 are base point coordinates.
NIST-recommended elliptic curve for GF(2233 )
Elliptic Curve 𝐸: 𝑦 2 + 𝑥𝑦 = 𝑥 3 + 𝑎𝑥 2 + 1, 𝑎 = 0
𝑓(𝑥 ) = 𝑥 233 + 𝑥 74 + 1
𝑛 = 8000000000000000000000000000069𝑑5𝑏𝑏915𝑏𝑐𝑑46𝑒𝑓𝑏1𝑎𝑑5𝑓173𝑎𝑏𝑑𝑓
G𝑥 = 17232𝑏𝑎853𝑎7𝑒731𝑎𝑓129𝑓22𝑓𝑓4149563𝑎419𝑐26𝑏𝑓50𝑎4𝑐9𝑑6𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑑6126
G𝑦 = 1𝑑𝑏537𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒819𝑏7𝑓70𝑓555𝑎67𝑐427𝑎8𝑐𝑑9𝑏𝑓18𝑎𝑒𝑏9𝑏56𝑒0𝑐11056𝑓𝑎𝑒6𝑎3

Table 6.1 NIST-recommended parameters

6.1 Implementation Hierarchy of the ECC operations
The building blocks of computation involved in ECC is illustrated in Fig. 6.1. Finite
field arithmetic such as field addition, subtraction, multiplication, inversion and squaring
are the fundamental computations. Both elliptic curve point addition and doubling are
based on the finite field computations. As the figure shown, the upper layer computatio ns
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are constructed by the lower layers. Scalar multiplication is realized by different algorithms
based on point addition and doubling. Elliptic curve cryptographic schemes such like
ECDSA are on the top.

ECC
Algorithm

Scalar multiplication

Point addtion
Point doubling
Finite Field Arithmatic
(addition,multiplication,inversion,squaring)

Figure 6.1 Hierarchical architecture for computation involved in ECC

The main components of this ECC design are: field multiplication, field squaring,
field inversion, group operations and random number generation. Recall that we introduced
the polynomial basis in Section. 2.1. All implementation module in this chapter are using
the polynomial basis representation.

6.2 Random Number Generation
In the pre-computation part, there three random binary sequence need to be
generated. This process is implemented with a linear feedback shift register (LFSR). A
LFSR is s sequential shift register with combinational logic that causes it to pseudo47

randomly cycle through a sequence of binary values. It has well-known applications in
generating pseudo-random binary sequence. A pseudo-random binary sequence is
considered pseudo because it will start to repeat the pattern after a certain number of states.
In order to make the generation more close to a real random number, the LFSR need to
reach its maximum length. In other words, an n bit LFSR need to generate all 2n -1 states
before it starts to repeat itself. By carefully chosen the positions of the bits feeding back to
the next state, a maximum length LFSR can be achieved.
For the case of the 233 bit random sequence, the tap value is 233 and 159 [40].
There are two structures of the LFSR. One is one-to-many structure (also known as Galois
LFSR). The other is many-to-one structure (also known as Fibonacci LFSR). As Fig.6.2
illustrated, a 233-bit Galois LFSR is built. This structure is chosen rather the many-to- one
structure, is because that Galois LFSR generates all the feedback bits parallel. In this way,
the LFSR runs more efficiently.

Figure 6.2 233-bit LFSR
The LFSR will generate three random sequence. The first random number will
continue generating until it is smaller than order of base point P, then it is assigned to k0
according to Algorithm 5.2. The second random sequence will generate and then assigned
to s, acting as the switch to determine which scalar multiplication is going to perform. The
third random sequence will be 𝑟, it will be used in the precomputation to compute 𝑟𝑃. Since
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𝑟 is random, 𝑟𝑃 will be random point. The computation will need the modules introduced
in later sections.
6.3 Addition in 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚 )
Field addition is very easy to implement in VHDL. As stated in Section. 2.1, field
addition is simply a bit-wise exclusive-or in either hardware or software. Subtraction in
𝐺𝐹(2𝑚 ) is the same as addition in 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚 ), since the additive inverse of an element is itself. All finite field addition is realized using simple x-or gate.
6.4 Multiplication in 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚 )
The classical way to implement multiplication is the two-step computation. To
perform a finite field multiplication, the first step is to do a multiplication and the second
step is reduction. Pamula introduced another basic architecture in [41]. It is called the
interleaved multiplication. In this method, the multiplication and reduction are interlea ved.
It is based on the following observation. Given two polynomials,
𝑎(𝑥 ) = 𝑎𝑚−1 𝑥 𝑚−1 + ⋯ 𝑎1 𝑥 + 𝑎0
𝑏(𝑥) = 𝑏𝑚−1 𝑥 𝑚−1 + ⋯ 𝑏1 𝑥 + 𝑏0
and define the irreducible polynomial
𝑓(𝑥 ) = 𝑥 𝑚 + 𝑓𝑚 −1 𝑥 𝑚−1 + ⋯ 𝑓1 𝑥 + 𝑓0
the product will be given by
𝑚−1

𝑐 (𝑥 ) = 𝑎(𝑥 )𝑏(𝑥) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑓(𝑥 ) = 𝑎(𝑥 ) ∑ 𝑏𝑖 𝑥 𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑓 (𝑥 )
0

𝑐(𝑥 ) = (𝑏0 𝑎(𝑥 )𝑥 + 𝑏1 𝑎(𝑥 )𝑥 2 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑚−1 𝑎(𝑥 )𝑥 𝑚−1 )𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑓(𝑥)
𝑎(𝑥 )𝑥 can be substituted by the following equation
𝑎(𝑥 )𝑥 = 𝑑 = 𝑎𝑚−1 𝑥 𝑚 + ⋯ 𝑎1 𝑥 2 + 𝑎0 𝑥
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𝑑0 = 𝑎𝑚−1 𝑓0
𝑑𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖−1 + 𝑎𝑚−1 𝑓𝑖

𝑑 = 𝑑𝑚−1 𝑥 𝑚−1 + ⋯ 𝑑1 𝑥 + 𝑑0 where {

By applying these equations, the following structure is implemented. In the right
part of Fig.6.3, a partial result interleaved with reduction is calculated. The output is used
as the input in next iteration and sent to the left to do the accumulation. The shift register
holds the value of b and shifts right in every iteration. The left part accumulate the partial
product in every iteration. And after m iterations, the result is computed.

Figure 6.3 Multiplication unit
6.5 Squaring in 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚 )
Polynomial basis squaring is relatively simple compared with multiplication. It is
very similar to the classical two-step multiplication. The squaring operation can be done in
two steps. The first step is to insert a 0 bit between consecutive bits of the binary
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representation. The second step is also the polynomial reduction. In Fig.6.4, a pattern for
squaring a polynomial 𝑎(𝑥) is shown.

Figure 6.4 Squaring a polynomial
The reduction of it can however be achieved using a method called the reduction
matrix [41]. The reduction matrix is constructed using the irreducible polynomial and can
be computed when the operation starts. Since the polynomial representation of the squaring
result before reduction is easy to get. Applying the reduction matrix method can greatly
speed up the reduction process.
6.6 Inversion in 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚 )
Inversion is the most time consuming operation among all the implementa tio n
module. There are serval existing method to do the field inversion over 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚 ), the
Fermat’s method and the extended Euclidean algorithm. While the Fermat’s method takes
lots of time to calculate the value, here we choose the extended Euclidean algorithm [42].
Euclid’s algorithm is for calculating the greatest common divisor of two polynomials. The
algorithm is extended to find two polynomials satisfying that
gcd(𝑎 (𝑥 ), 𝑏(𝑥 )) = 𝑢 (𝑥 ) × 𝑎(𝑥 ) + 𝑤(𝑥) × 𝑏(𝑥)
If 𝑎(𝑥) is an element of the field defined by irreducible polynomial 𝑓(𝑥), we had
the relation that gcd (𝑎(𝑥), 𝑓(𝑥)) = 1. By replacing 𝑏(𝑥) with 𝑓(𝑥), the above equation
is deduced to 1 = 𝑢(𝑥) × 𝑎(𝑥) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑓(𝑥). The inverse of 𝑎(𝑥) can then be calculated by
𝑎(𝑥)−1 = 𝑢(𝑥 ) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑓(𝑥)
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Algorithm.6.1 illustrates how the inverse is calculated, the implementation is
straight forward while the addition is done using x-or, division is done by right shift and
multiplication is done by left shift. The result is outputted after 2m iterations.
Algorithm 6.1. Extended Euclidean Method [42]
Input: 𝑎(𝑥 ), 𝑓(𝑥)
Output: 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑎(𝑥)−1
Step 1: 𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑠(𝑥 ) = 𝑓 (𝑥 ), 𝑣(𝑥 ) = 0, 𝑟(𝑥 ) = 𝑎(𝑥 ), 𝑢 (𝑥 ) = 1, 𝑑 = 0;
Step 2: 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖=0 𝑡𝑜 2m 𝑑𝑜
Step 3: 𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑚 = 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑟(𝑥 ) = 𝑥𝑟(𝑥), 𝑢(𝑥 ) = 𝑥𝑢(𝑥 ), 𝑑 = 𝑑 + 1
Step 4: 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑚 = 1,
Step 5: 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑠(𝑥) = 𝑠(𝑥) − 𝑣(𝑥), 𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑣(𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥)
Step 6: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓
Step 7: 𝑠(𝑥) = 𝑥𝑠(𝑥)
Step 8: 𝑖𝑓 𝑑 = 0,
Step 9: 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑟(𝑥) = 𝑠 (𝑥 ), 𝑠 (𝑥 ) = 𝑟(𝑥)
Step 10: 𝑢(𝑥 ) = 𝑥𝑣(𝑥 ), 𝑣(𝑥 ) = 𝑢(𝑥)
Step 11: 𝑑 = 1
Step 12: 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑢(𝑥 ) =

𝑢( 𝑥 )
𝑥

,𝑑 = 𝑑 − 1

Step 13: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓
Step 14: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓
Step 15: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟
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6.7 Elliptic Curve Group Operations in GF(2m)
The group operations in ECC are the point addition and point doubling operations.
As illustrated in Section 2.2, the group operations are implemented using the previous
modules. Fig. 6.5 shows the block diagram of the point addition operation.

Figure 6.5 Hardware architecture of point addition
It can be seen that as the equation in Section 2.2 shows, the point addition operation
module requires two multiplications, one squaring and one inversion.
Similarly, Fig 6.6 shows the architecture of point doubling module. It requires two
multiplications, two squaring and one inversion. The main computation part of Algorithm
5.2 is building using these two modules, in the next section. We will discuss how the
modified MPL with SM, ES and PR is realized.
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Figure 6.6 Hardware architecture of point doubling
6.8 Scalar Multiplication
As the main computation of the ECC, Algorithm 5.2 provides a whole new MPL
with strong resistance to SCAs. During the pre-computation process, the first scalar random
sequence 𝑘0 is generated. The second scalar 𝑘1 is computed by 𝑘 − 𝑘0 .Another random
sequence s is produced and finally the random point 𝑅 = 𝑟𝑃 is acting as the mask.
There four registers 𝑅0 , 𝑅1 , 𝑅2 and 𝑅3 holding 4 different intermediate values.
They are initialized by the 𝑥, 𝑦 coordinates of the base point 𝑃 and mask 𝑅. 𝑅0 and 𝑅1 are
given the value 𝑅 and 𝑃 + 𝑅 at the beginning. 𝑅2 and 𝑅3 are initialized with – 𝑅 and 𝑃 −
𝑅 . The anti-mask – 𝑅 shares the same 𝑥 coordinate with 𝑅 . While the 𝑦 coordinate is
calculated simply x-or the coordinates of mask 𝑅. Three shift registers to store the value of
𝑠, 𝑘0 , and 𝑘1 . The control unit is the core unit to realize the algorithm. The input and the
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output of the point addition and point doubling module is controlled by this unit. The
control unit has 36 different states to decide which value from which register to be given
as the input of point operation module, also at the same time, the specific register to store
the output is decided. The states are controlled by the three random values in the shift
register. Additionally, a counter aiming for m cycles is built in as to tell the whole process
when to stop the computation. Fig. 6.7 illustrates the blocking diagram of the top main
computation module.

Figure. 6.7 Architecture of proposed implementation
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6.9 Synthesis Results
The VHDL code is synthesized for Xilinx XC7VX690 using Vivado 2017. The
hardware resource usage is summarized in Table. 6.2. The computation time at 100 MHz
is 4.43 ms. We can see Algorithm 5.2 doubles the computation time needed since it consist
of two scalar multiplication. Fig. 6.8 shows the result of the output waveform.

Algorithm

Number
of FFs

Number
of LUTs

Number
of IOs

Clock
Cycles

Regular MPL

8317

8753

708

220,020

Algorithm 5.2

11247

11405

708

442,493

Table 6.2 Hardware usage of different algorithms implemented

Figure 6.8 Output waveform
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The hardware implementation results and performance comparisons with some
existing implementations are listed in Table. 6.3. It is to be noted that since the result
provided in literature are implemented on different FPGA technologies from out design.
Thus, a straight forward comparison is hard to make.

Work

Algorithm

Device

[32]

MPL

Spartan-3

GF(2

[44]

Binary

XC4VLX8
0

GF(2

[45]

Binary

XC2V6000

GF(2

[46]

MPL

GF(2

[47]

Binary

XCV2000E
-7
XCV2000E

[29]

NAF

XC3S1000

GF(2

[24]

Binary

XC7K325T

GF(2

Proposed

MPL

XC7VX690

Proposed

Modified XC7VX690
MPL

Field
163

163

233

233

233

FFs

LUTs

f(MH
z)

Time

Cycles

)

3265

130

1 ms

n.a.

)

24,263

143

n.a.

n.a.
n.a.

)

16970

19,440

100

n.a

)

10632

35,800

67.9

n.a

37

)

n.a.

n.a.

80

)

9407

9151

255.6
6

13.2
ms
2.28
ms
2.66
ms

GF(2233 )

8317

8753

100

2.2 ms

220020

11252

10405

246.1

1.8 ms

442493

GF(2

GF(2

233
233

233

15,478

n.a.

)

)

n.a.
183000
679776

Table 6.3 FPGA implementation complexity comparison between proposed design and
related works
From the table, it is clear that there are very few implementation done with
countermeasures, the main concern for most of the designs listed are speed. [4, 26, 41 and
43] adapted the projective coordinates to reduce the amount of inversion operation and
improve the calculation speed. Scalar multiplications in [32] uses MPL without any
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countermeasure. Implementations in [21, 41 and 42] uses binary method for scalar
multiplication. All these mentioned references are applying the algorithms without any
further protections.
Algorithm/Implementation

Doublin

Relative

Comparativ

M-

C-

High-

Template

g [8]

doubling [30]

e power

safe

safe

order

attack

analysis

error error

[36]

[37]

[31]

[19]

[9]

Binary [21,41,42,44]

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

NAF [29]

×

n.a

×

n.a

n.a

n.a

n.a

MPL [29,43]

√

×

×

×

√

n.a

n.a

Masked MPL [11]

√

n.a

√

√

n.a

n.a

×

Exponent Splitting [11]

√

n.a

√

√

n.a

×

n.a

Proposed

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

Table 6.4 Comparison of SCA countermeasure property between proposed work and
existing related works
Our proposed implementation on scalar multiplication is not as efficient as some of
the listed design such like [4 and 26]. But our implementation mainly focus to provide a
protected power trace to eliminate potential SCA threat. And the clock cycle is comparable
to some listed design such like [24]. Table. 6.4 shows that our implementation can resist
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most existing side channel attacks comparing with related implementations. Overall, our
implementation can provide better protection against SCAs.
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CHAPTER VII
DISCUSSION AND POSSIBLE FUTURE WORKS
7.1 Discussion
In this thesis, an efficient architecture for the scalar multiplication algorithm [11]
is proposed. A FPGA implementation of the algorithm [11] is presented. It is the first time
that this algorithm is implemented in hardware.
This implementation resistant to most existing side channel attacks such as
doubling attack [8], relative doubling attack [30], comparative power analysis [31], m-safe
error attack [19], c-safe error attack [9], high-order [36] and template attack [37]. As shown
in Table 6.4, compared to the existing related works, the proposed implementation offers
the best countermeasures to SCAs.
7.2 Possible Future Work
As a pseudo-random number generator, LFSR is simple and fast but its output does
not have the property of very good randomness. It follows a pattern that can repeat after a
certain number of states. Those sequences of numbers are random-like in some aspects. If
the attacker knows the seed and also the tap values, the randomness of the generated
sequence maybe compromised. A better random generator such like mentioned in [43] can
further protect the implementation.
In addition, since our design is implemented using affine coordinates, projective
coordinates [29] can be adopted in the design. The advantage of using projective
coordinates is that the amount of finite field inversion operation can be greatly reduced
with proper pre-computation. Finite field inversion operation is considered as the most time
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consuming module in ECC scalar multiplication. So the computation time may be
shortened if projective coordinate systems is adopted.
Moreover, this design features a regular bit serial interleaved multiplier. Faster
method for implementation such like digit level multiplier in [44] can be utilized to further
speed up the elliptic curve scalar multiplication.
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APPENDICES
SELECTED VHDL PROGRAMMING CODES
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Top level: Introduces the point coordinates and k through the same port
--Author: Che Chen
---------------------------------------------------------------------------library IEEE;
use IEEE.std_logic_1164.all;
use IEEE.std_logic_arith.all;
use IEEE.std_logic_unsigned.all;
package my_package is
constant m: natural := 233;
constant logm: natural := 8;
constant zero: std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0) := (others => '0');
end my_package;
library IEEE;
use IEEE.std_logic_1164.all;
use IEEE.std_logic_arith.all;
use IEEE.std_logic_unsigned.all;
use work.my_package.all;
entity top_MaskedMont is
port (
inData: in std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0);
-- xP_data, yP_data, k_data: in std_logic;
clk, reset, start: in std_logic;
outxQ, outyQ: inout std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0);
-- xQ_or_yQ: in std_logic;
done: out std_logic
);
end top_MaskedMont;
architecture circuit of top_MaskedMont is
component MaskedMont is
port (
xP, yP, xR, yR, y_minus_R, x_pplusr, y_pplusr, x_pminusr, y_pminusr: in std_logic_vector(m-1
downto 0);
k0, k1, s: in std_logic_vector (m-1 downto 0);
clk, reset, start: in std_logic;
xQ, yQ: inout std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0);
done: out std_logic
);
end component MaskedMont;
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component rand_gen is
Port ( clk : in STD_LOGIC;
reset : in STD_LOGIC;
start : in STD_LOGIC;
K : in std_logic_vector (m-1 downto 0);
k1,s,k0,r : out std_logic_vector (m-1 downto 0);
done : out STD_LOGIC);
end component rand_gen;
component EC_montgomery_multiplication is
port (
xP, yP, k: in std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0);
clk, reset, start: in std_logic;
xQ, yQ: inout std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0);
Q_infinity: inout std_logic;
done: out std_logic
);
end component EC_montgomery_multiplication;
component Point_add_v2 is
port(
x1,y1,x2,y2: in std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0);
clk, reset, start: in std_logic;
x3: inout std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0);
y3: out std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0);
done: out std_logic
);
end component Point_add_v2;
signal xP, yP, k0, k1, s, k, xQ, yQ, r, xR, yR, y_minus_R, x_pplusr, y_pplusr, x_pminusr, y_pminusr:
std_logic_vector (m-1 downto 0);
signal start_ran, start_main, ran_done, main_done, xP_data, yP_data, k_data, start_r_point,
r_point_done,
start_add1, add_done1, start_add2, add_done2: std_logic;
subtype states is natural range 0 to 14;
signal current_state: states;
begin
ran: rand_gen port map(
clk, reset, start_ran,k,
k1, s, k0, r, ran_done );
randomR: EC_montgomery_multiplication port map(
xP, yP, r,
clk, reset, start_r_point,
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xR, yR,
done => r_point_done);
y_minus_R <= xR xor yR;
P_plus_R: Point_add_v2 port map(xP, yP, xR, yR, clk, reset, start_add1, x_pplusr, y_pplusr,
add_done1);
P_minus_R: Point_add_v2 port map(xP, yP, xR, y_minus_R, clk, reset, start_add2, x_pminusr,
y_pminusr, add_done2);

MaskedMont port map(
xP, yP, xR, yR, y_minus_R, x_pplusr, y_pplusr, x_pminusr, y_pminusr,k0, k1, s,
clk, reset, start_main,
xQ, yQ, main_done );
registers: process(clk)
begin
if clk' event and clk = '1' then
if xP_data = '1' then xP <= inData; end if;
if yP_data = '1' then yP <= inData; end if;
if k_data = '1' then k <= inData; end if;
end if;
end process;
control_unit: process(clk, reset, current_state)
begin
end process;
outxQ <= xQ; outyQ <= yQ;
end circuit;
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Random number generator
---------------------------------------------------------------------------entity rand_gen is
Port ( Clk : in STD_LOGIC;
reset : in STD_LOGIC;
start : in STD_LOGIC;
K : in std_logic_vector (232 downto 0);
k1,s,k0,r : out std_logic_vector (232 downto 0);
done : out STD_LOGIC);
end rand_gen;
architecture Behavioral of rand_gen is
type state_type is (idle,s0,s1,s2);
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signal state : state_type := idle;
signal rand_out : unsigned(232 downto 0);
component lfsr is
port (clk,reset : in std_logic;
rand_out : out unsigned(232 downto 0)
);
end component;
begin
lfsr_inst : lfsr port map(Clk,'0',rand_out); --keep generating random numbers.
process(Clk,reset)
begin
if(reset = '1') then
state <= idle;
done <= '0';
elsif(rising_edge(Clk)) then
case state is
when idle =>
if(start = '1') then --start the fsm.
state <= s0;
end if;
done <= '0';
when s0 =>
if(rand_out < unsigned(K)) then --check if k0 is less than K
k0 <= std_logic_vector(rand_out);
k1 <= std_logic_vector(unsigned(K)-rand_out); --if yes, so
the subtraction and assign it to k1.
state <= s1;
else
state <= s0;
end if;
when s1 =>
if(rand_out < unsigned(K)) then --check if k0 is less than K
r <= std_logic_vector(rand_out);
state <= s2;
else
state <= s1;
end if;
when s2 =>
s <= std_logic_vector(rand_out); --the next random number is
assigned to s.
state <= idle;
done <= '1'; --done signal is asserted and goes back to idle state
waiting for next start signal.
end case;
end if;
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end process;
end Behavioral;
entity MaskedMont is
port (
xP, yP, xR, yR, y_minus_R, x_pplusr, y_pplusr, x_pminusr, y_pminusr: in std_logic_vector(m-1
downto 0);
k0, k1, s: in std_logic_vector (m-1 downto 0);
clk, reset, start: in std_logic;
xQ, yQ: out std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0);
--Q_infinity: inout std_logic;
done: out std_logic
);
end MaskedMont;
architecture arch of MaskedMont is
constant zero: std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0) := (others => '0');
component Point_add_v2 is
port(
x1,y1,x2,y2: in std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0);
clk, reset, start: in std_logic;
x3: inout std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0);
y3: out std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0);
done: out std_logic
);
end component;
component Point_double_v2 is
port(
x1, y1: in std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0);
clk, reset, start: in std_logic;
x3: inout std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0);
y3: out std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0);
done: out std_logic
);
end component;
signal xR0, yR0, xR1, yR1, xR2, yR2, xR3, yR3,
next_xR0, next_yR0, next_xR1, next_yR1, next_xR2, next_yR2, next_xR3, next_yR3:
std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0);
signal int_k0, int_k1, int_s: std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0);
signal add_in_x1, add_in_y1, add_in_x2, add_in_y2, dou_in_x, dou_in_y,
add_out_x, add_out_y, dou_out_x, dou_out_y: std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0);
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signal ce_R0, ce_R1, ce_R2, ce_R3, start_add, start_dou, add_done, dou_done, k_m_minus_1_0,
k_m_minus_1_1, s_m_minus_1,
reset_counter, count_down, last_step: std_logic;
signal step_number: std_logic_vector(logm-1 downto 0);
signal sel_R0, sel_R1, sel_R2, sel_R3, sel_in_dou, sel_in_add: std_logic_vector(1 downto 0);
subtype states is natural range 0 to 36;
signal current_state: states;
begin
with sel_R0 select next_xR0 <= add_out_x when "01", dou_out_x when "10", xR when others;
with sel_R0 select next_yR0 <= add_out_y when "01", dou_out_y when "10", yR when others;
with sel_R1 select next_xR1 <= add_out_x when "01", dou_out_x when "10", x_pplusr when others;
with sel_R1 select next_yR1 <= add_out_y when "01", dou_out_y when "10", y_pplusr when others;
with sel_R2 select next_xR2 <= add_out_x when "01", dou_out_x when "10", xR when others;
with sel_R2 select next_yR2 <= add_out_y when "01", dou_out_y when "10", y_minus_R when
others;
with sel_R3 select next_xR3 <= add_out_x when "01", dou_out_x when "10", x_pminusr when
others;
with sel_R3 select next_yR3 <= add_out_y when "01", dou_out_y when "10", y_pminusr when
others;
with sel_in_add select add_in_x1 <= xR0 when "00", xR2 when others;
with sel_in_add select add_in_y1 <= yR0 when "00", yR2 when others;
with sel_in_add select add_in_x2 <= xR1 when "00", xR0 when "11", xR3 when others;
with sel_in_add select add_in_y2 <= yR1 when "00", yR0 when "11", yR3 when others;
with sel_in_dou select dou_in_x <= xR0 when "00", xR1 when "01", xR2 when "10", xR3 when
others;-- "11"
with sel_in_dou select dou_in_y <= yR0 when "00", yR1 when "01", yR2 when "10", yR3 when
others;
register_R0: process(clk)
begin
if clk' event and clk = '1' then
if ce_R0 = '1' then xR0 <= next_xR0; yR0 <= next_yR0; end if;
end if;
end process;
register_R1: process(clk)
begin
if clk' event and clk = '1' then
if ce_R1 = '1' then xR1 <= next_xR1; yR1 <= next_yR1; end if;
end if;
end process;
register_R2: process(clk)
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begin
if clk' event and clk = '1' then
if ce_R2 = '1' then xR2 <= next_xR2; yR2 <= next_yR2; end if;
end if;
end process;
register_R3: process(clk)
begin
if clk' event and clk = '1' then
if ce_R3 = '1' then xR3 <= next_xR3; yR3 <= next_yR3; end if;
end if;
end process;
add: Point_add_v2 port map(add_in_x1, add_in_y1, add_in_x2, add_in_y2, clk, reset, start_add,
add_out_x, add_out_y, add_done);
double: Point_double_v2 port map(dou_in_x, dou_in_y, clk, reset, start_dou, dou_out_x, dou_out_y,
dou_done);
with step_number select last_step <= '1' when "00000000", '0' when others;
shift_register_k0: process(clk)
begin
if clk'event and clk = '1' then
if reset_counter = '1' then int_k0 <= k0;
elsif count_down = '1' then
for i in m-1 downto 1 loop int_k0(i) <= int_k0(i-1); end loop;
int_k0(0) <= '0';
end if;
end if;
end process;
k_m_minus_1_0 <= int_k0(m-1);

shift_register_k1: process(clk)
begin
if clk'event and clk = '1' then
if reset_counter = '1' then int_k1 <= k1;
elsif count_down = '1' then
for i in m-1 downto 1 loop int_k1(i) <= int_k1(i-1); end loop;
int_k1(0) <= '0';
end if;
end if;
end process;
k_m_minus_1_1 <= int_k1(m-1);
shift_register_s: process(clk)
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begin
if clk'event and clk = '1' then
if reset_counter = '1' then int_s <= s;
elsif count_down = '1' then
for i in m-1 downto 1 loop int_s(i) <= int_s(i-1); end loop;
int_s(0) <= '0';
end if;
end if;
end process;
s_m_minus_1 <= int_s(m-1);

output_xQ: process(clk, last_step)
begin
if clk' event and clk = '1' then
if last_step = '1' then
for i in 0 to m-1 loop
xQ(i) <= xR0(i);
yQ(i) <= yR0(i);
end loop;
end if;
end if;
end process;
end process;
end;
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